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Abstract 
I argue in this paper that some of the most basic commitments of Kantian ethics can be understood as 
grounded in the dynamic of sense that Merleau-Ponty describes in his Phenomenology of Perception. 
Specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account supports the importance of universalizability as a test for 
the moral permissibility of particular acts as well as the idea that the binding character of the moral law is 
given as something like a fact of reason. But I also argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account of reversibility 
suggests an important dimension of moral experience that is given in the experience of contact and that is 
underthematized in moral philosophies like Kant’s that emphasize the role of universalizability. Finally, I 
advance a positive account of moral experience that is centered on the idea of tact as ambiguous 
imperative. 
 
 In the Preface to his Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
writes that “because we are in the world, we are condemned to sense….”1 We are 
condemned to sense in two senses, which are indissociable. On the one hand, to be in the 
world is to find oneself immersed in sense. That there is sense, in other words, is not 
attributable to the act of any subject. Rather the world is given to us as making some kind 
of sense even before we are able to determine more precisely what sense it makes. To be 
condemned to sense, then, is to find oneself subjected to the sense of the world always 
already. On the other hand, we are also subjects of the sense of the world. We do not 
receive the sense of the world entirely passively, as wax receives a seal. Rather, the 
subject actively intends the sense of the world. The subject does so, however, only by 
catching onto and rendering progressively more determinate the sense that the world 
itself adumbrates. Merleau-Ponty illustrates this condemnation to sense well in his 
account of what happens when we perceive a color. We cannot see a color as blue, for 
example, simply by opening our eyes and looking at a blue object. The blue only appears 
as blue for the embodied subject that knows how to let itself be affected by it in the right 
way. “Thus a sensible datum which is on the point of being felt sets a kind of muddled 
                                                
1 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. xix). 
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problem for my body to solve. I must find the attitude which will provide it with the 
means of becoming determinate, of showing up as blue; I must find the reply to a 
question which is obscurely expressed…. The sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, 
but this is only what I took from it in the first place.”2 A similar dynamic accounts for the 
ways we make sense in contexts that are not simply perceptual. When I read a novel, for 
example, I do not find its sense arrayed before me fully formed in the black and white of 
its pages; it is not just there, fully present to my gaze. Rather, in order for the sense of the 
novel to emerge, I must animate the marks on the page with my meaning-bestowing 
intention. I must, in other words, act as the subject of sense. But of course I cannot 
animate the marks on the page with any intention I please, just as I cannot choose to see a 
perceptual stimulus as any color I please. To read the novel, I must make myself 
receptive to the sense that it itself adumbrates. This adumbrated sense exceeds the sense 
that I, the subject of sense, bring with me to the reading. If it did not, then novels would 
be of no interest to me: they would do no more than bring to mind significations I already 
had at my disposal. In reading a novel, then, “I am receiving and giving in the same 
gesture. I have given my knowledge of the language; I have brought along what I already 
know about the meaning of words, the phrases, and the syntax.”3 The author then makes 
use of this knowledge to point me in the direction of a sense that is new. This kind giving 
and receiving of sense in the same gesture characterizes not just our perception of color 
and our reading of novels, but our entire meaningful being-in-the-world. To be 
condemned to sense, then, is to find ourselves given over always already to a dynamic of 
sense in which we find ourselves indissociably active and passive, subject and subjected. 
                                                
2 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 214). 
3 Merleau-Ponty (1974, p. 11). 
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 In what follows, I would like to argue that the idea of our condemnation to sense, 
as Merleau-Ponty describes it, can yield important insights concerning the nature of our 
moral experience. More specifically, I will argue that this idea can be shown both to 
confirm and to challenge some of the most basic commitments of Kantian moral 
philosophy. First, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account supports the importance of 
universalizability as a test for the moral permissibility of particular acts. That is to say, it 
supports the idea that one’s choice—Willkür in Kant’s sense of the term—is insufficient 
to establish an act as morally permissible. We experience our choice as answerable to 
something else that functions as its measure. This insight, of course, is expressed in 
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, but I want to argue that it can also be expressed in 
terms of the dynamic of sense to which we find ourselves condemned. Second, I will 
attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty’s account supports the Kantian idea that the claims 
that morality makes on us cannot be legitimated through any kind of deduction. The 
binding character of the moral law, according to Kant, is given “as it were, as a fact of 
pure reason of which we are a priori conscious and which is apodictically certain….”4 
Third, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s account of reversibility suggests an important 
dimension of moral experience that is given in the experience of contact and that is 
underthematized in moral philosophies like Kant’s that emphasize the role of 
universalizability in our moral reasoning. Finally, referring to and expanding upon some 
of the most important insights in Kantian ethics, I will advance a positive account of 
moral experience that is centered on the idea of tact as ambiguous imperative. 
I. The Imperative of the World 
                                                
4 Kant, (1996a, p. 177 [5:47]). 
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 In Chapter Four of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes what 
he calls “the tacit thesis of perception,” a pre-reflective commitment to the idea that  
at every instant experience can be co-ordinated with that of the previous 
instant and that of the following, and my perspective with that of other 
consciousnesses—that all contradictions can be removed, that monadic 
and intersubjective experience is one unbroken text—that what is now 
indeterminate for me could become determinate for a more complete 
knowledge, which is as it were realized in advance in the thing, or rather 
which is the thing itself.5 
 
In perception, our consciousness does not lose itself in the full and unchallengeable 
presence of its objects. Rather, its objects are given as hollowed out, as gesturing beyond 
themselves toward the world as an “open and indefinite unity.”6 For example, often when 
I am driving on a hot summer day, I perceive a thin sheet of water some distance up the 
road. When this happens, I experience a kind of perceptual tension. On the one hand, the 
sheet of water is present, but on the other hand it is present as somehow unreal. This is 
possible because to see the water is also to see through it, in two different senses of 
“through.” In the first sense, I see through the water insofar as my gaze is not absorbed in 
it. In other words, I see the sheet of water as a part of a larger world in which it has its 
place. In the second sense, I see through the sheet of water insofar as I see beyond it by 
means of it. I do not, in other words, conceive of “world” in an act of pure intellection; 
rather, the things themselves point beyond themselves in the direction of a world. The 
sheet of water that I perceive on the road is given as incompatible with the world that it 
co-presents: it is a hot, dry day and nothing else in my field of vision seems to be wet. 
Unable to coordinate the perception of the water with the world as coherent, unified 
                                                
5 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 54). 
6 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 304). 
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whole, my perceiving body sides with the world: I treat the sheet of water as an optical 
illusion. 
 To be condemned to sense, then, is to find oneself oriented toward the world as a 
whole. This world as open and indefinite unity is not given to perception as one object 
among others; if I were to take an inventory of the objects given in my perception, I 
would not write “road, car, trees, sun, water, world.” The world is given rather as a 
project, as that toward which I am constitutively oriented and as the measure for the 
reality of whatever appears within it. We could even say that the world is given as a kind 
of imperative addressed to the sensory-motor powers of the knowing, perceiving body.7 
Hilary Putnam articulates this idea perspicuously, stating that if he were a metaphysician, 
he would be tempted to “create a system in which there were nothing but obligations…. 
Instead of saying with Mill that the chair is a ‘permanent possibility of sensations,’ [he] 
would say that it is a permanent possibility of obligations.”8 To perceive things, in other 
words, it is not sufficient merely to open one’s eyes. To perceive, one must perceive 
according to the things themselves, as they demand to be perceived. And as the example 
of the sheet of water demonstrates, that means perceiving things as inhering in and 
cohering with the world in which they are situated. The sheet of water that appears ahead 
of me on the road is given as not likely to be consistent with other perceptual experiences 
that I could arrange to have. It is given moreover as inviting my perceiving body to adopt 
the various points of view on it that would best settle the question of its reality or 
unreality. In sum, in its mode of givenness, the perceived object gives the world that 
measures it. 
                                                
7 Lingis (1998, p. 63-64). 
8 Putnam (1992, p. 115). 
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 We can recognize in this centrifugal orientation of sense from the given particular 
to the world that measures it the basis of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law: “Act only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.”9 In our moral experience, our felt desires and the possible courses of 
action that we represent to ourselves are given as standing in need of justification. Just as 
we do not accept the sheet of water as real simply because it is given as an object of 
perception, so we do not accept the moral permissibility of a course of action simply 
because it is given as an object of our faculties of desire. Indeed, if possible courses of 
action were given as self-validating, as requiring no measure by which to test their 
validity, then moral experience would be unthinkable. The measure for the morality of 
our acts, I want to argue, is given in accordance with what we might call the tacit thesis 
of moral experience. That is to say, it is given through the objects of desire. I contemplate 
a course of action, and that course of action points beyond itself toward a moral world, an 
open and indefinite unity within which particular acts either have a place or do not. If an 
act does not have a place within the projected moral world, then the act is, to use Kant’s 
formulation, morally impossible. If it does have a place, then it is morally permissible.  
 To see how this is the case, it will be helpful to look closely at one of Kant’s well-
known examples. If I am in serious financial difficulty, it might occur to me to ask a 
friend to lend me some money, even though I know perfectly well that I will not be able 
to pay her back at the agreed-upon time, if ever. If I am someone who is capable of moral 
experience, I find that my will—in the Kantian sense of Wille—is not determined to 
make the false promise simply on the basis of my having the inclination to do so. Like the 
sheet of water on the road, the inclination must be put to the test in order to determine 
                                                
9 Kant (1996b, p. 73 [4:421]). Italics omitted.  
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whether it really is what it gives itself to be, in this case a legitimate reason for 
undertaking a particular course of action. Once again, the act of putting the given to the 
test is not to be understood as a cognitive act entirely distinct from the act—in this case 
desiring—that first gives the object that is to be tested. Rather, to experience the 
inclination to make the lying promise is to experience it within the context of a moral 
world that transcends the point of view that I have on it at that moment. In the case of the 
sheet of water, I find that my sensory-motor body knows pre-reflectively how to take 
different points of view on the same object in order to determine whether or not it is 
really there. Likewise, the moral subject encounters the inclination to tell the lying 
promise as only provisionally justified and as soliciting different points of view, from 
which the act’s moral permissibility or impermissibility can be more firmly established. I 
can imaginatively adopt the point of view of the person to whom I propose to lie and see 
how my inclination looks from there. And more generally, I can adopt the point of view 
of the moral world as a totality and see how my inclination looks from that perspective. 
Again, the inclination to tell the lie is given as hollowed out, as calling for those other 
perspectives. If the view I get of the inclination when I imaginatively adopt the 
perspective of the moral world is incompatible with the view given from my more 
limited, particular perspective, then I take the side of the world, experiencing the 
inclination to benefit myself through the lying promise as not providing sufficient reason 
to pursue that course of action. The act of making the lying promise is revealed as 
morally impossible in much the same way the sheet of water is revealed as illusory: it is 
given as incompatible with the tacit thesis of moral experience. Lying promises could 
only exist as exceptions to the coherent, ordered laws of a moral world. 
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II. The Fact of Reason 
 At this point in the project of showing how some of the most basic features of 
moral experience can be understood in terms of our condemnation to sense, we have yet 
to account for the most important thing. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the 
account given so far is correct in at least its broad outlines: we recognize possible courses 
of action as morally prohibited or permissible by situating them in a larger context, and 
this context takes the form of something like a world as unified, coherent totality. What 
remains unclear is why we ought not to do what we recognize as morally prohibited and 
why we ought to do what we recognize as morally necessary. There is a large gap, it 
seems, between the recognition that x is wrong and the obligation to refrain from doing x. 
How, then, are we to close that gap?  
 Kant’s solution to this problem is to reject it on the grounds that it presupposes an 
account of moral experience that is descriptively inaccurate. It is not the case that we first 
encounter moral goodness and badness as objects of theoretical reason, in the way that 
we recognize shape and magnitude for example. According to Kant, to recognize that an 
act is morally impermissible just is to experience oneself as obligated, as the addressee of 
an imperative to refrain from performing that act. Our recognition of a possible act as bad 
does not require any kind of supplement—be it a striving for eudaimonia, a fear of 
punishment, the promise of a reward in the afterlife, etc.—that would supply the 
incentive not to do it. If such a supplement were required to bridge the gap between 
recognition and obligation, then moral justification would be endlessly deferred. If I 
recognize my natural concern for my own happiness as giving me an incentive to do x, I 
am still left with the question, Why ought I to take that as a legitimate reason for doing x? 
 9 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that we do not need to answer this 
question. We do not have to give any kind of legitimation of the obligating force of the 
moral law, and indeed, we could not give such a legitimation even if we wanted to. 
According to Kant, the morally binding character of the law is given as a fact of reason: it 
“cannot be proved by any deduction, by any efforts of theoretical reason, speculative or 
empirically supported, so that even if one were willing to renounce its apodictic certainty, 
it could not be confirmed by experience and thus proved a posteriori; and it is 
nevertheless firmly established of itself.”10  
 There are, of course, some very serious problems with Kant’s invocation of the 
supposed fact of reason. First, the concept does not appear to be the conclusion of any 
kind of philosophical argument; it looks rather like a means of cutting the Gordian knot. 
This was certainly the way many readers of Kant have interpreted it. Hegel, for example, 
described the fact of reason as “the last undigested lump in our stomach, a revelation 
given to reason.”11  Schopenhauer characterized it as “a Delphic temple in the soul.”12  
And more recently, Paul Guyer has suggested that the argument “seems to rely on a good 
deal of foot-stamping.”13 Second, it is unclear how the concept of the fact of reason is 
even meant to cut the Gordian knot. Lewis White Beck has suggested that there are two 
possible interpretations of how it does so.14 The first interpretation treats the doctrine of 
the fact of reason as a kind of intuitionism: we are conscious of the obligatory character 
of the moral law in an immediate way, much as we are conscious of the greenness of 
grass. If someone were to ask me to defend my claim that the grass is green, I would have 
                                                
10 Kant (1996a, 178 [5:47]). 
11 Hegel (1974, p. 461).  Cited in Henrich (1994, p. 69).   
12 Schopenhauer (1903, p. 68).  Cited in Henrich (1994, p. 69). 
13 Guyer (2007, p. 462).  
14 Beck (1965, p. 209-211). 
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nothing to say except that I just see it that way. On this interpretation, I cannot justify my 
claim that the moral law has obligating force; I can only report that I intuit it that way. 
This interpretation is unconvincing: my perception of color is certainly not infallible, and 
there doesn’t seem to be any reason to suppose that my intuition of the bindingness of the 
law would be any different. (This, of course, presupposes that we have such an intuition 
in the first place; it is far from obvious that we do.) According to the second 
interpretation, it is simply a fact that we are conscious of the moral law as obligating us. 
This interpretation is even less plausible than the first. It is a fact that I am sometimes 
conscious of a sheet of water some distance up the road, and nonetheless it turns out that 
the sheet of water is illusory. Likewise, it may be a fact that I am conscious of the 
bindingness of the moral law, but that does not in any way establish the actual 
bindingness of the law. In both of these interpretations, the purported fact clearly stands 
in need of legitimation or confirmation, but that is exactly what Kant’s recourse to the 
fact of reason was meant to preclude. 
 I do not know precisely how Kant himself meant for the doctrine of the fact of 
reason to be understood; at different points in the Critique of Practical Reason, he 
suggests very different, and indeed incompatible, interpretations. But in order for the fact 
of reason to play the role that Kant clearly meant it to play in his moral philosophy, viz. 
making unnecessary any deduction of the objective validity of the moral law, it must be 
understood in such a way as to render the practical subject responsive and responsible to 
the law always already. The problem that Kant means to solve is nicely articulated by 
Christine M. Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity: as beings who are capable of 
reflection, we can always back up from the reasons for action that we experience and ask 
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ourselves whether they are ultimate and authoritative reasons.15 Does the feeling of 
obligation I have, for example, when a police officer orders me to leave the scene of an 
accident or of a protest give me an authoritative reason to actually leave the scene? Does 
the feeling of obligation I have when I contemplate the majesty of the moral law give me 
such a reason? As long as it remains possible for the practical subject to step back in this 
way from the purported reason for action and to question its authoritativeness, the 
obligation remains merely provisionally valid. If unconditional obligation is a genuine 
phenomenon, then there must be some experience from which the practical subject 
cannot step back and reflect. What I want to argue is that the only such experience is that 
of finding oneself responsive to the law always already. And this experience must be 
what is named by the fact of reason. It must be the case, in other words, that one cannot 
even be a practical subject without already having taken the moral law as authoritative. 
One is not first a self-identical, fully-formed subject who would subsequently experience 
something like obligation and decide its validity or invalidity on its own terms. Rather, 
the very act of stepping back from the purported reason for action and testing its 
objective validity would be understood as responsive to a law whose validity the subject 
cannot help accepting. One is a practical subject only as having responded always 
already. 
 To say that we are condemned to sense, as Merleau-Ponty does, is precisely to say 
that we find ourselves responsive pre-subjectively to the imperative of the world in 
something like the way suggested by Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason. Merleau-Ponty 
expresses this idea with remarkable clarity in a passage from Phenomenology of 
Perception: 
                                                
15 Korsgaard (1996, p. 93). 
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Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not my own being, the 
one for which I am responsible and for which I make decisions, but another self 
which has already sided with the world, which is already open to certain of its 
aspects and synchronized with them. Between my sensation and myself there 
stands always the thickness of some primal acquisition which prevents my 
experience from being clear of itself. I experience the sensation as a modality of 
general existence, one already destined for a physical world and which runs 
through me without my being the cause of it.16 
“World” here is not intended primarily in the sense of the projected totality with 
reference to which we measure the reality of given particulars. What Merleau-Ponty has 
in mind, rather, is the world as a kind of “nascent logos,” a pre-reflective ground of our 
meaningful being-in-the-world.17 To return to an earlier example, the blue that I perceive 
is given first as “a kind of muddled problem for my body to solve.”18 It is given as 
gesturing toward a sense—blue—that will only become crystallized for a subject that 
knows how to orient itself toward it in the correct way. The subject to which the muddled 
problem is addressed is not the self-conscious subject given in reflection. I do not 
encounter sense data as objects of my consciousness and then think to myself, “I shall 
comport myself bodily toward these puzzling data in such a manner as to see them as 
blue.” Rather, the subject to whom the sensible problem is addressed is “another subject 
beneath me, for whom a world exists before I am here.”19  Between this pre-reflective, 
embodied subject and the world there exists a kind of communication “more ancient than 
                                                
16 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 216). 
17 Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 25). 
18 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 214). 
19 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 254). 
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thought.”20 This subject knows prior to all reflection how to respond appropriately to the 
nascent logos of the world because it is itself of the world.21  
 Importantly, this subject that has already sided with the world and that knows how 
to take up its nascent logos is not me, this particular person who identifies himself with 
this or that history and with this or that set of projects and responsibilities. Rather this 
other subject beneath me is impersonal and general, what Merleau-Ponty calls the “On 
primordial.”22 Most fundamentally, I do not make sense of the world in accordance with 
my particular will (Willkür), but rather as “one” makes sense of the world, as anyone in 
general does. “One” is thus oriented by the imperative of the world, of universality and 
generality, always already. This is just a fact, in Kant’s sense of the term. I cannot 
effectively back up from this fact and demand a deduction of the imperative’s legitimacy, 
for that very imperative is the condition for the possibility of the question’s 
meaningfulness at all. I cannot even ask the question, in other words, without already 
having accepted the imperative’s binding force. 
III. Contact and the Ambiguity of Moral Subjectivity 
 Up to this point, the account of our condemnation to sense has suggested a picture 
of ethical experience that confirms some of the most basic commitments of Kantian 
ethics. But this account both of the dynamic of sense and of ethical experience has been 
one-sided. According to Merleau-Ponty, the centrifugal orientation of sense toward the 
world as open and indefinite unity is indissociable from a centripetal orientation of sense 
that anchors our being-in-the-world here, in the given particular. This point is developed 
most explicitly as the doctrine of reversibility in The Visible and the Invisible, but it is 
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21 Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 134-135). 
22 Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 175). 
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prefigured throughout Phenomenology of Perception. The paradigm case of this 
reversibility is the experience of one of our hands touching the other. If I touch my left 
hand with my right, I experience something like a double sensation: I sense my right hand 
as touching and my left as touched. But the characterization of this as a double sensation 
is somewhat misleading: “When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two 
sensations felt together as one perceives two objects placed side by side….”23 Rather, 
what I have is one ambiguous sense. I sense my left hand as touched, but I also sense it as 
on the verge of touching. Correlatively, I sense my right hand as touching, but on the 
verge of being touched. The roles of touching and touched, subject and object, in other 
words, are experienced as reversible. My capacity to touch is inseparable from my 
capacity to be touched and vice versa. Because of this, I cannot straightforwardly occupy 
the position of subject of my experience. Rather, my subjectivity presupposes a contact 
with myself, such that I am indissociably subjected to that contact and subject of it. 
 One might suppose that this non-coincidence and ambiguity in subjective 
experience pertains only to the special case of one hand touching the other, since in that 
case the sensor and the sensed really are the same being. It seems that the phenomenon of 
reversibility cannot apply to cases in which the object of touch is something in the 
external world, for in such cases it is clear that the thing touched is the object and that the 
one who touches is unambiguously the subject. But this is exactly what the reversibility 
thesis denies. At the most originary level of my contact with the world, the level from 
which my meaningful being-in-the-world first opens out, I am touched by the world. This 
being-touched is not a vanishing moment that gives way in favor of the ideal sense-
bestowal that it makes possible. Rather, I experience the object in the world with an 
                                                
23 Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 93). 
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opaque affectivity that is ineliminable and that prevents that object from giving itself as 
nothing more than a token of its type. In being contacted by the world, I am anchored to 
the particular, and this anchorage is an ineliminable part of its meaning.  
 Let us suppose, for example, that I want to determine whether a particular Hermès 
necktie is genuine or counterfeit. As Hermès silk tends to have a very distinctive tactile 
quality, I would determine the true sense of the tie by touching it. Of course I cannot just 
lay my hand on top of the tie if I hope to determine correctly whether it is genuine or 
counterfeit. Nor can I touch the silk in the way that I would touch an iron to determine 
whether or not it was hot, or in the way that I would touch a table to determine whether or 
not it was sturdy. Rather, I must touch the tie in the way best calculated to ensure the 
success of my project. That means that I must touch the tie is it demands to be touched: I 
must move my finger lightly over its surface. In doing so, of course I feel the tie itself; it 
is the object of my touch. But in feeling the tie, I necessarily feel myself feeling the tie. 
Indeed, if I did not feel myself feeling the tie, then I would not be feeling the tie at all. 
The moment of activity would be impossible without the moment of passivity. If my 
touching the tie were not also a being-touched by it, I would be completely unable to 
catch on to the way that it needed to be touched in order to be given as what it is, namely 
as a tie of such and such a kind. In sum, it is only because this particular tie is present to 
me most basically as affecting and ordering my corporeal sensibility that I am able 
correctly to intend its sense and its place in the coherent and unified world. If the tie is 
given to perception in its truth as what it is—a genuine Hermès—it nonetheless remains 
ineluctably the case that it is this tie that is an Hermès. The stubborn persistence of the 
this in the experience of this thing as a genuine Hermès is due to the irreducible 
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ambiguity of the contact that gives our most originary opening out onto the meaningful 
world. 
 For Kant, this centripetal orientation of sense toward the given particular is the 
source of what we might call moral noise. For information theory, noise refers to the 
various kinds of interference that prevent a piece of information from being received 
without distortion. The static that distorts or drowns out the message conveyed by radio is 
an example. Noise for the most part gives itself as something to be eliminated, or at least 
minimized. The static on the radio, for example, is given as something through which one 
must struggle to hear the message. The static has no value in its own right; ideally it 
would not be present at all. For Kant’s moral philosophy, the message is the moral law, 
which is valid for all rational beings, irrespective of their particularities—their likes and 
dislikes, their prospects for gain and loss, or their affective relations to particular persons 
or things in the world. In our practical dealings, we are in fact concerned with these 
particularities. I care about the well-being of this particular friend who finds himself in 
this particular bad predicament, and so I am inclined to help him by telling a lie. But the 
particular toward which I am oriented obscures my recognition of the obligatory 
character of the universal. For finite rational beings like us—beings who are capable of 
thinking the universal but who are also sensuous beings anchored to the particular—
moral action takes the form of a constant struggle against the noise. 
 In thus prioritizing the centrifugal orientation of sense, Kant presents a one-sided, 
and thus misleading, picture of moral experience. What I want to argue, based in large 
part on Merleau-Ponty’s account of the reversibility of the touching-touched relation, is 
that the objects of our moral experience are not given most originarily simply as cases 
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falling under the universal moral law. My wealthy friend, for example, is not simply 
someone-in-general to whom I must not make a lying promise. The objects of our moral 
experience are, of course, given as cases falling under the law, but they are given just as 
originarily in the experience of contact, an experience in which I as moral subject am 
touched.  As a being condemned to sense, I find myself—or rather, the other subject 
beneath me—oriented always already toward and by this particular person or this 
particular situation. This contact is morally meaningful; it is not merely the beginning 
point of a dynamic of moral sense that reaches its culmination in the universal. The 
importance for our moral experience of our anchorage in particular situations can be 
brought out especially clearly by reference to Kant’s notorious argument in the essay “On 
a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy.” According to Kant, to tell the truth is “a 
sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally.”24 One must tell the truth even if 
one is asked by a prospective murderer at the door whether his intended victim has taken 
refuge within one’s home. This conclusion is counterintuitive, to say the least; it seems as 
if we would do a great and irreparable wrong to the intended victim by telling the truth to 
the prospective murderer. But for Kant, the moral sense of a situation emerges 
exclusively from our orientation toward the universal. The correct focus of our moral 
concern, therefore, is not this particular person—the intended murder victim—but rather 
this person qua case falling under the law. And the law, according to Kant, is 
unambiguous: we must tell the truth, irrespective of the good or bad consequences that 
might follow. From a moral point of view, then, this particular person is merely a person-
in-general about whom the truth must be told. Any concern we might have for the well-
being of the intended victim amounts to a kind of noise obscuring our recognition of the 
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unconditionally obligatory character of the pure moral law. To make the intended 
victim’s well-being the measure of our conduct would be to fall back onto the 
paradigmatically non-moral motive of “convenience.”25 But this seems like the kind of 
conclusion that one could accept only, as Aristotle says, if one were “maintaining a thesis 
at all costs.”26 Concern for the well-being of this particular person is obviously more than 
a concession to mere expediency or a pretext to disburden oneself of genuinely moral 
obligation. Our moral consciousness is and ought to be anchored at the level of the 
particular human being whose life or death depends on the course of action we choose.  
IV. Tact 
 At this point, I hope to have demonstrated an irreducible ambiguity right at the 
level of our most originary opening out onto a world of moral sense. The dynamic of 
sense to which we find ourselves given over always already orients us at once 
centrifugally toward the world as open and indefinite unity and centripetally toward 
particular situations. This ambiguous dynamic has its beginning in an experience of 
contact, which gives the moral subject as both touching and touched, subject and 
subjected. In this final section, I would like to argue that the ambiguity of moral 
subjectivity entails an ambiguity in the moral imperative. I will attempt to articulate this 
ambiguous imperative as a kind of tact. More precisely, I will argue that to be tactful is to 
be appropriately responsive to the ambiguous imperative that is given in our 
condemnation to sense. The word “tact” serves well here not only because of its obvious 
etymological connection to the sense of touch, but also because it gathers within itself the 
very ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty has described in his account of sense generally, and 
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in his account of reversibility more specifically. On the one hand, tact signifies a “keen 
faculty of perception or discrimination likened to the sense of touch.”27 This sense of the 
term emphasizes the subjective role of mastery and sense-bestowal. I demonstrate my 
tact, for example, when I correctly determine the sense of the purported Hermès necktie 
as genuine or counterfeit. But on the other hand, we also mean by tact the “ready and 
delicate sense of what is fitting and proper in dealing with others, so as to avoid giving 
offence, or win good will; skill or judgement in dealing with men or negotiating difficult 
or delicate situations; the faculty of saying or doing the right thing at the right time.”28 
Alphonso Lingis captures this sense of tact well, characterizing it as “a light touch, supple 
and agile, a holding back. It contrasts with the touch involved in the apprehension, 
appropriation, and manipulation of tangible things and of others.”29 In this sense of the 
term, one cannot exercise tact by subsuming a case under a rule; what is required, rather, 
is a sensitivity to the particularities of what is given in this situation. And as Lingis 
suggests, this requires a holding back, a resistance to the centrifugal orientation of sense 
that would lead us to submit the particularities of the case straightaway to the test of the 
universal. To tell the truth to the prospective murderer who asks after the whereabouts of 
his intended victim is, in this regard, to demonstrate a culpable lack of tact. 
 In the case of the prospective murderer, considerations of tact lead us 
straightforwardly to what most of us, I suspect, would regard as the obviously correct 
solution. It would be a mistake, though, to believe that this represents the normal case. 
Moral experience is irreducibly ambiguous; it has its basis in our being oriented both 
centrifugally and centripetally, in such a way that neither orientation simply trumps the 
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other. Because of that, we can never be certain that we have done the right thing. There 
can be no rule for the application of tact, or for assessing the relative weights of the 
universal and of the given particular. We cannot, on the one hand, make it our rule that 
concern for the particular case ought always to override concern for the universal. If the 
police come to my door and ask if the murderer, who is a friend of mine, has taken refuge 
there, I probably ought to tell them the truth. The universal clearly does make a genuine 
moral claim on me: I ought not to take action that contributes to a world in which 
murderers go unpunished, even in the case where the murderer is my friend. On the other 
hand, for reasons that we have seen, we cannot make it our rule that concern for the 
universal ought always to override concern for the particular. This, of course, is what 
Kant denies. In the second Critique, he insists that what is required by the moral law “is 
seen quite easily and without hesitation by the most common understanding.”30 And in 
the Groundwork, he argues that the moral subject has the law “always before its eyes and 
uses [it] as the norm for its appraisals. Here it would be easy to show how common 
human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish in every 
case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or 
contrary to duty. . . .”31 But this, I want to argue, is clearly untrue. There are many cases 
in which we experience a morally significant pull toward the universal and a similarly 
significant pull toward the nuances specific to the present case. For example, we are often 
called upon to comfort those who have suffered greatly from illness or from the deaths of 
loved ones, or perhaps from failures of projects, such as marriage or professional 
advancement, that have been vitally important to them. We do not know easily and 
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without hesitation how best to proceed in these cases. Is it really the case that 
communicating our thoughts to such persons “through words that yet (intentionally) 
contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks” would constitute an unambiguous moral 
wrong, one that would annihilate the speaker’s dignity as a human being?32 Faced with 
such situations, we often say things like “Everything is going to be all right,” even though 
we do not really believe that things will be all right. In doing so, we establish a kind of 
contact, one that is responsive to the needs of that person in that particular situation. And 
establishing that contact is a moral act despite its violating the categorical command 
never to express what one believes to be untrue; we would do the person a real moral 
wrong if we engaged with him in an utterly tactless way, reducing him to a case falling 
under the law. For all that, the person we comfort is still a person who falls under the law. 
While it seems appropriate to tell him things will be all right, we ought still to regard our 
dealings with him as falling under the rule about lying. We ought not, for example, to try 
to cheer him up by telling him that he has won the lottery or that his favorite baseball 
team has won when in fact they did not. We are pulled in two directions at once, and 
sometimes it is hard to tell which claim ought to win out. If my friend has just been fired 
from his job and expresses shock at the great wrong that his boss has done him, I might 
think the best thing to do is to say “yeah” and nod in agreement, even if I believe the 
firing was justifiable. There may come a time when I ought to tell him the truth, that he 
has engaged in conduct, probably unknowingly, that has alienated his colleagues and that 
has made him a liability in the workplace. But now may not be the time for that. I can 
never know easily and without hesitation when the right time is; to engage with my friend 
in the most morally appropriate way requires tact. 
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 A second illustration of tact as ambiguous imperative concerns our duty to 
beneficence. According to Kant, “to be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one’s 
means the happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return, is 
everyone’s duty.”33 Of course happiness means different things to different people, and 
so a certain degree of tact is required in applying the rule to particular cases. Moreover, 
the moral subject must use her judgment in determining how much effort she will expend 
to promote the happiness of a particular person; this judgment depends in large part on 
the details of the case, for example on the capacity of the other person to promote his own 
happiness without help. And finally, the moral subject is entitled to make her own 
judgments about what will make the other person happy, sometimes disregarding the 
person’s own opinion on the matter. Kant himself recognizes that the moral subject must 
exercise her own judgment in these ways, and that her judgment will require some 
sensitivity to the details of the case. But for all that, beneficence is a duty; the subject is 
“constrained by [her] reason to adopt this maxim as a universal law.”34 What I want to 
argue is that tact is required in cases falling under the duty to beneficence to a much 
greater degree than Kant suggests, and that this tact may in some cases require us to hold 
back, to resist the centrifugal movement by which we would view the other person 
merely as a case falling under the law. According to Alphonso Lingis, for example, “tact 
understands that the other may need and want his suffering, in pursuing his destiny.”35 
There are surely cases in which we would wrong another person by treating her as 
someone-in-general whose happiness we ought to promote. I am thinking especially of 
the case of Simone Weil, who imposed enormous suffering on herself out of an 
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extraordinary degree of compassion for others who were also suffering. Even as a very 
young child, Weil refused to eat sugar once she learned that the French soldiers in World 
War I could not have any.36 Later, in a London hospital at the age of thirty-four and with 
her health rapidly declining, Weil again refused to eat sufficiently on the grounds that 
many of the inhabitants of occupied France were starving at the time.37 Weil was clearly 
somebody who greatly valued her own suffering. Ought her friends to have urged her to 
renounce the lifestyle she valued so much in favor of one that would bring her a greater 
yield of happiness? I believe that if I had known Weil, I would have felt the pull of the 
duty to beneficence in the form that Kant articulates it. I would have felt I owed it to her 
to try to convince her to change her life, especially since the suffering she inflicted on 
herself produced scarcely any benefit at all for those for whom she expressed so much 
concern. But I certainly would not know easily and without hesitation that I ought to do 
that. Although her style of life is difficult for me to comprehend, I am nonetheless 
sensitive to the fact that she experienced it as absolutely necessary. Perhaps what I would 
have owed her is respect and support for her project. To choose correctly in a case like 
that would obviously be a matter of great moral importance, and yet it seems clear that 
the imperative that weighs upon the one who must choose is ambiguous, pulling 
simultaneously in two directions. Again, what is required to deal with the case 
appropriately is tact. 
 As a final example, I would like to examine the phenomenon of contempt. Once 
again, Kant has important insights into this phenomenon that come very close to 
expressing the moral importance of tact. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant asserts that 
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“to be contemptuous of others (contemnere), that is, to deny them the respect owed to 
human beings in general, is in every case contrary to duty.”38 What is especially 
remarkable about this prohibition of contempt is that it applies in all cases, even in our 
dealings with people who have acted in ways that really do make them worthy of 
contempt. Kant is not arguing here that we must not feel contempt at all for such people; 
indeed, he suggests that in many cases we cannot help doing so.39 Rather, what we must 
never do is express the contempt that we feel. And this means that we must hold back, 
resisting the movement by which we would deal with persons merely as cases falling 
under the law. Taking the perspective of the moral law, for example, we cannot judge the 
person who commits fraud in his business dealings as anything but contemptible, and yet 
we must not put that judgment into practice by treating him as contemptible. What does it 
mean in practice to treat someone as contemptible? Kant answers this question by means 
of examples that seem so wildly different that they could not possibly function as 
examples of the same phenomenon. His first example concerns excessively cruel forms 
of punishment, “such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, [or] cutting off his 
nose and ears.”40 The second example of treating others with contempt is judging their 
errors too harshly, “calling them absurdities, poor judgment, and so forth.”41 What these 
examples have in common is that both involve closing off our receptiveness to the claims 
that the others might make on us. Reducing others to moral nothings, we foreclose the 
possibility of experiencing them as constraining our conduct in relation to them. This is 
obviously the case in the example of torture, but it applies in the case of censuring others’ 
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errors too severely as well: according to Kant, to treat others as utterly lacking in 
understanding is to close off the opportunity to help them recognize the ways in which 
their reasoning went wrong.42  
 But here again, I want to argue that our duty not to treat others with contempt 
requires more in the way of sensitivity and receptivity to the particularities of the other’s 
position than Kant himself believes. If my reason for not criticizing another’s judgment 
too harshly is that I would thereby close off the possibility of helping him to see his error, 
then I conceive of myself as having the right to make unilateral judgments about the other 
without the possibility of appeal. My judgment that the other is in error and ought to be 
corrected is not in question. To adopt this kind of position relative to the other, I want to 
argue, is still to view the other with a degree of contempt. To genuinely treat the other 
with respect, I ought not to arrogate to myself the right unilaterally to determine the sense 
of his words or deeds. I ought rather to approach the other in something like the way 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that we approach a novel, bringing with me the stock of 
understanding that I already possess but also maintaining myself in a position of 
openness to the other’s sense, which is not already mine and which is in many ways 
unforeseeable. It is possible, although by no means certain, that the other’s action has a 
moral sense to which, for whatever reason, I had been blind. The duty not to hold others 
in contempt must be understood as requiring us at minimum to remain open to that 
possibility. 
 What all three of these examples demonstrate is that there is always more moral 
sense in play in any given situation than we have at our disposal. There is no position 
from which we can survey all of the relevant meaning, and this is just because our moral 
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subjectivity is irreducibly ambiguous in the ways that Merleau-Ponty has described. As 
practical subjects, we find ourselves oriented always already by the imperative of the 
world, determining the moral sense of particular acts in something like the way 
prescribed by Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. But this movement toward the universal 
begins with a kind of contact that is generative of a moral sense that also makes a claim 
on us. Owing to this irreducible ambiguity of moral sense, we are unable to rely on any 
rule or decision procedure to show us the way to the unambiguously right course of 
action. But this does not absolve us of the responsibility for getting the moral sense right. 
What I have attempted to show in this paper is that there is no access to the right moral 
sense except by means of the specific kind of sensibility called tact. 
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